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Abstract
The information theoretic approach to security entails harnessing the correlated randomness available
in nature to establish security. It uses tools from information theory and coding and yields provable
security, even against an adversary with unbounded computational power. However, the feasibility of this
approach in practice depends on the development of efficiently implementable schemes. In this article, we
review a special class of practical schemes for information theoretic security that are based on 2-universal
hash families. Specific cases of secret key agreement and wiretap coding are considered, and general
themes are identified. The scheme presented for wiretap coding is modular and can be implemented
easily by including an extra pre-processing layer over the existing transmission codes.
Index Terms
2-Universal hash family, information theoretic security, modular coding schemes, secret key agree-
ment, wiretap codes.
I. INTRODUCTION
Random variations in physical observations constitute a valuable resource for facilitating security in
engineering systems. Authentication keys can be extracted from noisy recordings of biometric signatures
[81], [56]; unique signatures for hardware devices can be generated by implanting a physically uncloneable
function (PUF), implemented using random manufacturing variations in the period of a ring-oscillator
[76], [31]; secret keys extracted from the random fade of a wireless communication channel can be used
for cryptographic applications [107]; various physical layer security techniques can be used to mitigate
the security threats in cyberphysical systems and ad-hoc networks [99], [57]; and wiretap codes can
be used for protection against side-channel attacks [17]. The information theoretic approach for security
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2entails developing a systematic theory for designing and analyzing security primitives based on harnessing
physical randomness. In this approach, we treat physical observations as a source of randomness hidden
from the attacker and study the design of optimal codes for accomplishing specific security objectives.
One limitation of this approach is the assumption that the attacker does not have a complete access to
or cannot manipulate the correlated randomness used for implementing security. In lieu, we can provide
information theoretic security guarantees which hold even when the attacker has unlimited computational
power.
The origin of information theoretic security, as well as of theoretical cryptography, lies in the seminal
paper of Shannon [88]. This paper shows that in order to securely transmit an m-bit random message
over an insecure public channel the transmitter and the receiver must share an m-bit perfect secret
key1, i.e., m uniformly distributed bits that are concealed from an eavesdropper with access to the
public channel. This requirement of large perfect secret keys is impractical, and thus, the result of
[88] is largely considered a negative result. Following the pioneering work of Diffie and Hellman [28],
modern cryptography circumvents this restriction by relaxing the security requirement from information
theoretic security to security against a computationally bounded adversary. However, a different remedy
is possible in situations where the transmitter and the receiver have access to correlated randomness,
which is available to the eavesdropper only in part. Specifically, it was shown by Wyner in [104]
that if the eavesdropper can access only a noisy version of the observations of the legitimate receiver,
secure transmission2 is feasible without requiring any additional resources. Furthermore, it was shown in
[12], [71], [2] that information theoretically secure secret keys can be extracted from correlated random
observations by communicating over an insecure, public communication channel. These works constitute
the basic foundations of information theoretic security, suggesting that the requirement of large secret
keys for the feasibility of information theoretic security can be circumvented if correlated randomness is
available.
Inspired by these results, practical schemes for information theoretically secure message transmission
and secret key agreement have been proposed, utilizing the correlated randomness available in the physical
communication channel (cf. [6], [70], [22], [105]) or the correlated randomness extracted from physical
observations (cf. [81], [56], [76], [31]). However, most of the practical schemes proposed have either no
theoretical guarantees of performance or are suboptimal. In fact, even for the basic problems of secret
1Shannon [88] established the necessity of an m-bit perfect secret key only for the case when a one-time-pad is used for
encryption. The general necessary condition for any scheme was shown in [69] (see, also, [58, Problems 2.12 and 2.13], [51],[97,
Section VI]).
2Strictly speaking, we are concerned with the transmission of confidential messages in the presence of passive eavesdroppers.
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3key agreement and coding for a wiretap channel, optimal practical schemes are few and have emerged
only over the last decade (see [15], [29], [106], [82], [20] for optimal schemes for secret key agreement
and the review article [36] for references on optimal codes for a wiretap channel).
In this article, we review a class of practical coding schemes for attaining information theoretically
secure secret key agreement as well as for information theoretically secure message transmission in a
wiretap channel model. Specifically, we focus on schemes that use 2-universal hash families (UHF) [18]
(see Section III for the definition of a UHF) as a building block. This restriction in scope is for two
reasons: First, UHFs are easy to implement and are ideally suited for lightweight cryptography (cf. [61],
[108]), and second, while review articles are available that cover the role of error-correcting codes in
physical layer security (cf. [73], [36]), the UHF based schemes for wiretap channels are recent and are
not well-known.
The remainder of this article is organized as follows. We begin by describing the secret key agreement
and the wiretap coding problem in the next section. In the subsequent section, we define a UHF and
discuss its basic properties and some practical implementations. In the final two sections, we review UHF
based coding schemes for secret key agreement and wiretap channels.
II. PRIMITIVES FOR INFORMATION THEORETIC SECURITY
In this section, we describe two basic primitives for information theoretic security. Both rely on the
correlation in the random observations of legitimate parties; however, the form of correlation is different
in each. The first of these, namely secret key agreement, is concerned with extracting shared secret bits
from noisy correlated random data. The second, coding for wiretap channels, focuses on sending data
over a noisy channel when a passive eavesdropper observes noisy versions of the transmissions. The two
problems seem to be different in their scope and objective. Yet similar schemes based on error-correcting
codes and UHF will be seen to be optimal for both in many cases.
Note that the basic cryptographic primitives of oblivious transfer [78] and bit commitment [16], too,
have information theoretically secure counterparts; see, for instance, [21], [74], [101], [4], [80], [97] and
[102], [53], [79], [97], respectively, for treatments of information theoretically secure oblivious transfer
and bit commitment. However, there are only a few practical schemes available (cf. [53]), and they will
not be reviewed here.
A. Secret key agreement
Discrete, correlated random variables X and Y , with arbitrary but known distribution PXY , are observed
by the first and the second party, respectively. The parties seek to agree on random, unbiased bits. These
March 23, 2016 DRAFT
4correlated random variables correspond to random physical observations and can be derived, for instance,
from different noisy recordings of the same biometric fingerprint, or from the random fade observed in a
wireless communication channel. The parties also have access to a public communication channel such as
a shared public server, or a broadcast channel, or any other insecure communication network. They can
use this communication channel to exchange bits with each other; however, the bits exchanged will be
available to a (passive) eavesdropper. The mode of communication allowed depends on the application at
hand. For instance, in the biometric and PUF applications, only one sided communication from X to Y is
available since Y corresponds to a later (in time) recording of X itself. In general, the parties can execute
an interactive communication protocol Π with multiple rounds of interaction and possibly randomized
communication in each round3. The goal is to derive a secret key K consisting of bits (K1, ...,Kl) such
that (i) with large probability, both parties can recover K accurately; (ii) bits (K1, ...,Kl) are almost
independent and unbiased; and (iii) an eavesdropper with access to the communication Π and a side
information Z cannot ascertain any information about K.
X Y
Kx Ky
⇧
Eavesdropper Z
Side Information
(a) Secret key agreement protocol
Statistician limited to
algorithms in a fixed complexity class
Test
vsPK⇧Z Punif ⇥ P⇧Z
KxKy⇧Z
Security requires this test
to fail with large probability
(b) Computational security requirement
Statistician with
unlimited computation power
Test
vsPK⇧Z Punif ⇥ P⇧Z
KxKy⇧Z
Security requires this test
to fail with large probability
(c) Information theoretic security requirement
Fig. 1: Illustration of secret key agreement
Condition (i) above constitutes the recoverability requirement. Parties must form estimates Kx and Ky
3The communicated data Π is sometimes referred to as helper data.
March 23, 2016 DRAFT
5of K such that
P (Kx = Ky = K) ≥ 1− ,
for a suitably small parameter .
Conditions (ii) and (iii) above constitute the security requirement. Traditional notion of cryptographic
security is computational and requires (cf. [32]) that a computationally bounded adversary with access
to efficient algorithms for solving problems in a particular complexity class, but not beyond it, cannot
reliably distinguish if the observed outputs of the secret key agreement protocol (K,Π, Z) are coming
from the real protocol or an ideal one with all values of K equally likely for each realization of (Π, Z).
In contrast, [12], [71], [2] initiated the study of the secret key agreement problem under information
theoretic security where the computationally bounded adversary above is replaced by an unrestricted one
with access to any statistical test4. Formally, it is required that the statistical distance between the joint
distribution PKΠZ and Punif×PΠZ is small. Two popular measures of statistical distance that have been
used in secret key agreement literature are the K-L divergence [71], [2], [11], [23], [26], [27], [41]
D(P‖Q) =
∑
i
Pi log
Pi
Qi
,
and the total variation distance [85], [83], [42]
‖P −Q‖1 = 1
2
∑
i
|Pi −Qi|.
For concreteness, we shall consider security of secret keys under the total variation distance and require
‖PKΠZ − Punif × PΠZ‖1 ≤ δ,
where Punif is a uniform distribution on l-bits. Figure 1 illustrates the setup and a comparison of the
computational and information theoretic security criteria. For given values of recoverability and security
parameters  and δ, we seek to design secret key agreement protocols that yield as many bits of secret
key K as possible, i.e., the largest possible value of l above.
The theoretical limits of the length of secret keys possible have been studied extensively: [71] and [2]
considered the case when the underlying observations are independent and identically distributed (IID)
and, under a weaker notion of security than that above, characterized the secret key capacity, i.e., the
maximum rate of secret key length per observation; [11], [23], [3], [72] provide basic tools for attaining
the stronger notion of security above without any loss of performance; [26] establishes the secret key
4For another connection between binary hypothesis testing and secret key agreement, see [95], [97].
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6capacity for a multiparty version of the problem; [85], [83] derive bounds on the secret key length for the
single-shot case above, when only one-sided communication is allowed; [95], [44], [46] give the best-
known bounds for the general problem above, stressing on the role of interactive communication. However,
none of these works give an efficient secret key agreement scheme. The literature on constructive coding
schemes, on the other hand, is narrow and has focused mostly on the case with one-sided communication.
In this article, we will discuss a class of constructive schemes for secret key agreement that rely on UHFs.
B. Coding for wiretap channel
The problem of wiretap coding is that of transmitting a message with confidentiality from an eaves-
dropper with side-information. Specifically, a senders seeks to communicate a message M to a receiver
by using transmissions over a noisy communication channel T with inputs from a set X and outputs from
a set Y . For each input x to T , the receiver observes an output y with a given probability density T (y|x).
Furthermore, for each transmission x an eavesdropper observes the output z of another communication
channel W . It is required that while the legitimate receiver decodes M with a low probability of error,
while the message remains concealed from the eavesdropper (or the wire-tapper). See Figure 2 for an
illustration.
T
T
X1
Xn Yn
Zn
Z1
Y1
W
WX1
Xn
Legitimate
receiver
Eavesdropper
Zn
Y n
e(·)
e(M)
M
d(·)
e(M)
Mˆ
Fig. 2: Illustration of wiretap channel
An (n, k) code for this wiretap channel consists of a (stochastic) encoder e : {0, 1}k → X n and
a decoder d : Yn → {0, 1}k. A random message M is sent as e(M) and decoded as Mˆ = d(Y n),
where Y n = (Y1, ..., Yn) denotes the outputs for n independent uses of the channel T for inputs
(X1, ..., Xn) = e(M). At the same time, an eavesdropper gets to observe the outputs Zn corresponding to
transmitting the inputs Xn over the channel W . It is required that the code (e, d) ensures high reliability,
i.e. P
(
M 6= Mˆ
)
≈ 0 (it is required that P
(
M 6= Mˆ
)
goes to 0 sufficiently rapidly in n), and ensures
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7security under an appropriate notion. The rate of this code is (k/n); the maximum possible asymptotic
rate of a wiretap code is called the wiretap capacity of (T,W ).
This basic model was introduced by Wyner in [104] where he considered a degraded wiretap channel
where W = V ◦ T for some stochastic mapping V , i.e., the eavesdropper’s observation is a further
noisy version of the legitimate receiver’s observation, and for an input x the eavesdropper’s channel
produces an output z with probability W (z|x) = ∑y V (z|y)T (y|x). For this important special case,
Wyner characterized the wiretap capacity under the weak security requirement given by
lim
n→∞
1
n
I(M ∧ Zn) = 0,
where the message M is a uniform random variable and I(U∧V ) denotes the mutual information between
random variables U and V [25]. Later, Csisza´r and Ko¨rner characterized C for all discrete, memoryless
wiretap channels [24].
Interestingly, the wiretap capacity remains unchanged even if we drop the normalization by n in the
weak security condition above and require strong security [23]
lim
n→∞ I(M ∧ Z
n) = 0,
for a uniform message M . A still more demanding notion of security introduced5 in [10] requires security
not only for a uniform message M but any random message M and is given by
lim
n→∞maxPM
I(M ∧ Zn) = 0.
In fact, [10] extended the cryptographic notion of semantic security (cf. [32]) to the wiretap channel
and showed that it is implied by the security requirement above. In this article, we shall use the term
semantic security synonymously with the security requirement above, keeping in mind that, in fact, we
are demanding something even stronger than semantic security.
It remains an open question if the wiretap capacity can be achieved under semantic security, in general.
However, for specific wiretap channels, codes that achieve wiretap capacity while ensuring semantic
security have been proposed recently ( cf. [43], [66], [8], [10], [64]). In particular, the schemes in [43],
[41], [8], [48], [42], [96] rely on UHFs and are discussed below.
5 This notion of security is termed mutual information security in [10] and source universality in [48].
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8III. 2-UNIVERSAL HASH FAMILIES
The key primitive that underlies all the schemes that will be discussed in this article is a UHF. Universal
hashing was introduced by Carter and Wegman in their seminal work [18] as a multipurpose tool for
theoretical computer science and was applied for privacy amplification first in [12]. A UHF is, roughly
speaking, a family of functions such that the random mapping obtained by uniformly choosing a function
from this family is almost invertible. In information theory, as in theoretical computer science, many of
the proofs are completed using a random mapping or binning or coloring of elements of a set. It turns
out that most of the tasks that can be done using a completely random mapping can also be done by a
randomly selected member of a UHF. Moreover, while implementing a random mapping is not practical,
structured implementations of certain UHFs are available (cf. [61], [108], [50] and [42, Appendix II]).
Thus, UHFs constitute an efficiently implementable substitute for random mappings.
Formally, a family F consisting of mappings f : X → {1, ..., 2k} is a (k-bit) UHF if for every x 6= x′
1
|F| |{f ∈ F : f(x) = f(x
′)}| ≤ 2−k, (1)
i.e., the random mapping F chosen uniformly over F maps two distinct values to the same output with
probability less than 2−k.
The diverse applications of UHFs in information theoretic security include: secret key agreement
(cf. [11], [85], [41]), quantum key distribution (cf. [83]), biometric and hardware security (cf. [29]),
and coding for wiretap channels (cf. [38], [43], [8], [48]); see [91] for other applications in cryptography.
In these applications, the importance of a UHF lies in the role it plays in randomness extraction in source
and channel models. In a source model, we consider a randomness which is observed by a legitimate
party and is generated by a fixed distribution. On the other hand, in a channel model, the randomness is
observed by an adversary and its distribution is controlled by a legitimate party. Basic results were first
derived for source models and, later, variants of these basic results were derived for channel models; we
shall review the results for both these cases below.
A. Source models
In a source model, the available random observation and eavesdropper’s observation are modeled by
correlated random variables (X,Z). In applications such as secret key agreement, we seek to design
a primitive that extracts from X uniformly distributed random bits that are almost independent of Z.
UHFs described above provide a constructive tool for realizing such a primitive. First, we consider the
special case of a constant Z. The main result here is the leftover hash lemma which shows roughly that
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9the output of a randomly chosen member of a k-bit UHF applied to a random variable X constitutes
uniformly random bits, provided that k is smaller than a threshold. Different versions of leftover hash
lemma are available in literature, each with a slightly different choice of this threshold (cf. [55], [54],
[11], [37], [91], [83], [85]). We review a version due to [83], [85] where the aforementioned threshold for
randomness extraction is given by the smooth min-entropy Hmin(PX) of the underlying random variable
X , defined as follows [83], [85]: The min-entropy of X is given by [86]
Hmin(PX) = min
x
− log PX (x) ,
and the -smooth min-entropy of X is defined as [84], [85], [83]
Hmin(PX) = sup
Q: ‖P−Q‖1≤
Hmin(Q).
The leftover hash lemma uses a randomly selected member of a given UHF. In order to facilitate this
random selection, we assume that a random seed S distributed uniformly over a discrete set S is available
to both the legitimate party as well as the eavesdropper. While bounding the leaked information of the
extracted bits, eavesdropper’s knowledge of the random seed is taken into account as well.
Lemma 1 (Leftover hash: No side information). Consider random variables X taking values in a
finite set X . Then, for a k-bit UHF consisting of mappings {fs, s ∈ S} and a random seed S distributed
uniformly over the set S, it holds for every  ∈ [0, 1) that
‖PfS(X)S − Punif × PS‖1 ≤ +
1
2
√
2k−Hmin(X).
The first instance of a variant of this result, for the special case  = 0, appeared in [54] (see, also,
[37] for further strengthening of this result). The term “leftover hash lemma” appeared in [55] where
a strengthening of the result of [54] was given with Re´nyi entropy of order 2 in place of min-entropy.
The form given above is a special case of a general result in [83], [85] for the case where, in addition
to the random seed S, the eavesdropper observes a (possibly continuous-valued) random variable Z. In
this general version, the threshold Hmin(X) is replaced by the -smooth conditional min-entropy given
by [84], [83]
Hmin(PXZ |Z) = sup
QXZ : ‖PXZ−QXZ‖1≤
Hmin(QXZ |Z),
where Hmin(QXZ |Z) denotes the conditional min-entropy
Hmin(PXZ |Z) = sup
QZ :supp(PZ)⊂supp(QZ)
Hmin(PXZ |QZ)
March 23, 2016 DRAFT
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and, for PZ and QZ with densities fP and fQ (with respect to a measure µ on Z), respectively,
Hmin(PXZ |QZ) = inf
x∈X ,z∈supp(QZ)
− log PX|Z (x|z) fP(z)
fQ(z)
.
Note that smooth min-entropies replaces Shannon entropies as a measure of randomness in the context
of randomness extraction (see [11, Section VI] for further discussion). However, for IID observations
Xn, Shannon entropy constitutes the leading asymptotic term in smooth min-entropy of PXn (cf. [83]).
We depict the result of [83], [85] in Figure 3. Below, we recall a further generalization where the
side information Z available to the eavesdropper consists of a finite-valued random variable Z1 and a
continuous-valued random variable Z2; see, for instance, [46, Appendix B]) for a proof.
X
Z
Residual randomness
UHF
Uniform bits
independent of     
H✏min(X|Z)
Fig. 3: Leftover hash property of UHFs
Lemma 2 (Leftover hash). Consider random variables X,Z1, Z2 taking values, respectively, in a finite
set X , a (possibly uncountable) set Z1, and a finite set Z2. Then, for a k-bit UHF consisting of mappings
{fs, s ∈ S} and a random seed S distributed uniformly over the set S, it holds for every  ∈ [0, 1) that
‖PfS(X)Z1Z2S − Punif × PZ1Z2S‖1 ≤ +
1
2
√
|Z2|2k−Hmin(PXZ1 |Z1).
In essence, the result above says that Hmin(PXZ1 |Z1)− log |Z2| almost uniform bits which are almost
independent of (Z1, Z2) can be extracted from X . To measure “almost” uniformity and independence,
the results above use the total variation distance. An alternative form of the leftover hash lemma, with
the K-L divergence replacing the variation distance, was derived in [11] and is reviewed below.
Lemma 3 (Leftover hash: Divergence form). Consider random variables X,Z taking values, respec-
tively, in a finite set X and a (possibly uncountable) set Z . Then, for a k-bit UHF consisting of mappings
{fs, s ∈ S} and a random seed S distributed uniformly over the set S, it holds that
D
(
PfS(X)ZS‖Punif × PZS
) ≤ 2k−Hmin(PXZ |PZ)
ln 2
.
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Note that by Pinsker’s inequality (cf. [25]), the K-L divergence form yields the total variation distance
form (up to a constant factor). On the other hand, using the continuity of entropy in total variation distance,
a K-L divergence form was derived using the total variation distance form above in [41] (see, also, [26,
Lemma 1]). Both the total variation distance form and the K-L divergence form of the leftover hash
lemma given above combine the requirement of almost uniformity of fS(X) and security of fS(X) from
an observer of (Z, S) into a single criterion. In fact, the result in [11] shows that k −H(fS(X)|ZS) =
k−H(fS(X)) + I(fS(X)∧ZS) is bounded above by 2k−Hmin(PXZ |PZ)/ln 2, which in turn implies that
the mutual information I(fS(X)∧ZS) is bounded above by the same quantity6. In the information theory
literature, traditionally, mutual information has been used as a measure of information leakage7 (cf. [88],
[104], [24]), and the result above says that the information about fS(X) leaked to the eavesdropper is
small as long as k is sufficiently smaller than Hmin(PXZ |PZ). It was noted in [38, Appendix III] that,
under an almost uniformity assumption for fS(X), a bound on I(fS(X) ∧ ZS) yields a bound on the
total variation distance ‖PfS(X)ZS −Punif ×PZS‖1. On the other hand, a counterexample was given to
show that a small ‖PfS(X)ZS − Punif × PZS‖1 need not guarantee a small I(fS(X) ∧ ZS).
In practice, one is interested in characterizing the optimal tradeoff between information leakage and
the range-size k of the UHF used. For the case of IID observations Xn, [39] considered the optimal
k = kn() required to attain a given leakage  as a function of n and studied the second-order asymptotic
term, for both the total variation distance and the K-L divergence criteria (see the textbook [34] and the
references therein for a treatment of general sources beyond IID). In a different regime, [41] studied
the exponential decrease in the leakage for increasing n, for a fixed rate k = nR for the total variation
distance based leakage and the mutual information leakage, with a focus on the latter; optimal exponents
for decay rate of the total variation distance based leakage as a function of n were obtained in [42].
B. Channel models
Another class of models relevant for the wiretap channel entails a channel V : X → Z between
the legitimate party and the eavesdropper. For each input x ∈ X selected by the legitimate party, the
eavesdropper observes a random variable Z ∈ Z with distribution Vx. The goal is to determine a stochastic
map (a channel) Γ :M→ X such that for the composite channel V ′ = V ◦ Γ, with inputs from M and
outputs in Z , it holds that
6The quantity k−H(fS(X)|ZS) was defined as a security index in [26] and was noted to equal D
(
PfS(X)ZS‖Punif × PZS
)
.
7Bounds on leakage measured by Re´nyi information quantities were derived recently in [49].
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(i) For a uniformly distributed input M of Γ, the random variable M is almost independent of the
output Z of V ′ observed by the eavesdropper; and
(ii) M can be determined from the input X of V .
Note that in the source model discussed in the previous section, the distribution of X is fixed and a
uniformly distributed M is obtained as F (X), the output of a randomly chosen member F of a UHF.
In contrast, in the channel model we fix the distribution of M and seek to design Γ such that the
two properties above hold. Here, too, a constructive scheme can be obtained using a UHF satisfying
certain “balanced” conditions. Specifically, we consider a UHF {fs : X → {0, 1}k, s ∈ S} satisfying the
following balanced condition: For every seed s ∈ S and m ∈ {0, 1}k,
|{x ∈ X | fs(x) = m}| = 2b.
The condition above says that for each member of the UHF, the cardinality of each inverse-image set is
the same. We call a UHF satisfying the condition above a b-balanced UHF.
A b-balanced UHF can be used to design the aforementioned stochastic map Γ :M→ X as follows:
For each m ∈ M, choose X uniformly over f−1S (m), where the random seed S is chosen uniformly
over S. The next result is a counterpart of the leftover hash lemma for the channel model and shows that
the requirement (i) above holds if b is less than a threshold. The first instance of such a result appears in
[43, Section V]. The weaker version below uses a different threshold which is often easier to evaluate.
Specifically, the threshold in the lemma below is given by the smooth max-information of the channel,
which is defined as follows: Consider a subnormalized channel V : X → Z with a finite input alphabet
X and such that for each x ∈ X the measure V (· | x) on Z has a density ω(z|x) with respect to a
measure µ on Z . The max-information of V is given by
Imax (V ) = log
∫
max
x∈X
ω(z|x) dµ.
For a subset T of X × Z , denote by VT the subnormalized channel corresponding to the density
ωT (z | x) =
ω(z|x), (x, z) ∈ T ,0, otherwise. (2)
The -smooth max-information of V , Imax (V ), is given by the infimum of Imax (Vτ ) over all sets
T ⊂ X × Z such that
V ({z : (x, z) ∈ T } | x) ≥ 1− , for all x ∈ X . (3)
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Note that the smoothing operation in the definition of smooth max-information is different from the one
used in defining smooth max-entropy above, but is similar to the definition of smoothing in [85].
Lemma 4 (Leftover hash: Channel model). Given a channel V : X → Z, with a finite input set
X and arbitrary output set Z , and an b-balanced k-bit UHF {fs : s ∈ S}, suppose that for each
m ∈ M = {0, 1}k and s ∈ S the input X of V is chosen uniformly over f−1s (m). Then, for a random
variable M distributed uniformly on M ,
I (M ∧ Z, S) ≤ 1
ln 2
· 2−(b−Imax(V )) + k, (4)
where the seed S is distributed uniformly over S.
Proof: Consider a b-balanced UHF {fs, s ∈ S}. We first prove the bound in (4) for the special case
of  = 0. To that end, note first that the conditional density of Z (w.r.t. µ) given M = m and S = s is
given by
dPZ|M,S
dµ
(z|m, s) =
∑
x∈f−1s (m)
1
|f−1s (m)|
· ω(Z | x)
= 2−b
∑
x∈X
1 (fs(x) = m)ω(z | x), (5)
where the equality is by definition of a b-balanced UHF. Similarly, since M and S are independent and
M is distributed uniformly over {0, 1}k, the conditional density of Z (w.r.t. µ) given S = s is given by
dPZ|S
dµ
(z|s) = 2−b−k
∑
m∈M
∑
x∈X
1 (fs(x) = m)ω(z | x)
= 2−b−k
∑
x∈X
ω(z | x), (6)
where we have used
∑
m∈M 1 (fs(x) = m) = 1. By (5) and (6), we get
I (M ∧ Z, S) (7)
= I (M ∧ Z | S)
= E log
dPZ|M,S
dPZ|S
= E log
2−b
∑
x′∈X 1 (fS(x
′) = M)ω(Z | x′)
2−b−k
∑
x′′∈X ω(Z | x′′)
= E log
2k
∑
x′∈X 1 (fS(x
′) = M)ω(Z | x′)∑
x′′∈X ω(Z | x′′)
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=
2−b−k
|S|
∫
Z
∑
s∈S,m∈M,x∈X
[
1 (fs(x) = m)ω(z | x) log
2k
∑
x′∈X 1 (fs(x
′) = m)ω(z | x′)∑
x′′∈X ω(z | x′′)
]
µ(dz). (8)
Since the summand inside
[ · ] is nonzero only for m = fs(x), we can replace the term 1 (fs(x′) = m)
with 1 (fs(x′) = fs(x)) to obtain
I (M ∧ Z, S)
=
2−b−k
|S|
∫
Z
∑
s∈S,m∈M,x∈X
1 (fs(x) = m)ω(z | x) log
2k
∑
x′∈X 1 (fs(x
′) = fs(x))ω(z | x′)∑
x′′∈X ω(z | x′′)
µ(dz)
=
2−b−k
|S|
∫
Z
∑
s∈S,x∈X
ω(z | x) log 2
k
∑
x′∈X 1 (fs(x
′) = fs(x))ω(z | x′)∑
x′′∈X ω(z | x′′)
µ(dz)
≤ 2−b−k
∫
Z
∑
x∈X
ω(z | x) log 2
k
∑
x′∈X |S|−1
∑
s∈S 1 (fs(x
′) = fs(x))ω(z | x′)∑
x′′∈X ω(z | x′′)
µ(dz), (9)
where the last inequality is by Jensen’s inequality applied to the log function. Furthermore, using the
UHF property (1) for the UHF {fs, s ∈ S} we have
1
|S|
∑
s∈S
1
(
fs(x
′) = fs(x)
) ≤ 2−k1 (x′ 6= x)+ 1 (x′ = x),
which along with (9) gives
I (M ∧ Z, S)
≤ 2−b−k
∫
Z
∑
x∈X
ω(z | x) log 2
k
∑
x′∈X
(
2−k1 (x′ 6= x) + 1 (x′ = x))ω(z | x′)∑
x′′∈X ω(z | x′′)
µ(dz)
≤ 2−b−k
∫
Z
∑
x∈X
ω(z | x) log
∑
x′∈X ω(z | x′) + 2kω(z | x)∑
x′′∈X ω(z | x′′)
µ(dz)
= 2−b−k
∫
Z
∑
x∈X
ω(z | x) log
(
1 +
2kω(z | x)∑
x′′∈X ω(z | x′′)
)
µ(dz)
≤ 2
−b
ln 2
∫
Z
∑
x∈X ω(z | x)2∑
x′′∈X ω(z | x′′)
µ(dz),
where the previous inequality uses ln(1 + x) ≤ x for all x ≥ 0. Therefore, on observing that∑
x∈X ω(z | x)2∑
x′′∈X ω(z | x′′)
≤ max
x
ω(z | x) = 2Imax(W ),
we get
I (M ∧ Z, S) ≤ 1
ln 2
· 2−(b−Imax(W )),
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which completes the proof for the case  = 0.
Moving to the case  > 0, consider a set T ⊂ X × Z satisfying (3). Note that by log-sum inequality
∑
x∈X
1 (fs(x) = m)ω(z | x) log
2k
∑
x′∈X 1 (fs(x
′) = m)ω(z | x′)∑
x′′∈X ω(z | x′′)
≤
∑
x∈X :(x,z)∈T
1 (fs(x) = m)ω(z | x) log
2k
∑
x′∈X :(x′,z)∈T 1 (fs(x
′) = m)ω(z | x′)∑
x′′∈X :(x′′,z)∈T ω(z | x′′)
+
∑
x∈X :(x,z)∈T c
1 (fs(x) = m)ω(z | x) log
2k
∑
x′∈X :(x′,z)∈T c 1 (fs(x
′) = m)ω(z | x′)∑
x′′∈X :(x′′,z)∈T c ω(z | x′′)
(10)
Thus, upon denoting the right-side of (8) by g(V ), (8) and (10) give
I (M ∧ Z, S) ≤ g(VT ) + g(VT c),
where VT and VT c are defined in (2). Proceeding as in the  = 0 case, we get
g(VT ) ≤ 1
ln 2
· 2−b+Imax(VT ).
Furthermore, using the simple bound
log
2k
∑
x′∈X :(x′,z)∈T c 1 (fs(x
′) = m)ω(z | x′)∑
x′′∈X :(x′′,z)∈T c ω(z | x′′)
≤ k
we get
g(VT c) ≤ P ((X,Z) ∈ T c) k ≤ k,
where the previous inequality uses the assumption that T satisfies (3). It follows upon combining the
inequalities above that
I (M ∧ Z, S) ≤ 1
ln 2
· 2−(b−Imax(VT )) + k.
The proof is completed using the definition of -smooth max-information upon optimizing Imax (VT )
over sets T that satisfy (3).
Thus, the leakage I (M ∧ Z, S) is small as long as b is much smaller than Imax (V ). As in the case
of source model, here, too, it is of interest to determine the optimal leakage exponent. Furthermore, it is
of interest to derive bounds on leakage for other measures such as the total variation distance measure8;
one instance of such bound is available in [47] for the special case when the channel V is given by a
8In applying this bound to the case of wiretap channel, the channel V will be chosen to be the concatenation of the legitimate
transmission channel and an error correcting code for it.
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concatenation of a random code and another transmission channel.
C. Implementations
An efficient implementation of a k-bit UHF for an l-bit input can be obtained as follows [18], [61]:
Let {0, 1}l correspond to the elements of GF (2l) and let S = {0, 1}l \{0}. For k ≤ l, define a mapping
f : S × {0, 1}l → {0, 1}k as follows:
f(s, x) = (s · x)k,
where (x)k selects the k most significant bits of x. It is easy to see that the family of mappings {fs(x) :=
f(s, x), s ∈ S} constitutes a UHF. In fact, it is easy to see that this UHF is a (l − k)-balanced UHF.
Furthermore, for m ∈ M = {0, 1}k, a uniform distribution on the inverse-image set f−1s (m) (required
in the channel version of the leftover hash lemma) can be computed efficiently, too, using the mapping
φ(s,m,R) = s−1 · (m,R), where R denotes (l − k) uniform random bits and (m,R) denotes the
concatenation of m and R. Note that φ is indeed the inverse of f since f(s, φ(s,m, r)) = m for every
s,m, r.
Note that in order to implement the aforementioned UHF fs (and its inverse φ) efficiently, we require
an efficient implementation of multiplication and inversion in GF (2l). One such efficient implementation
was given in [89] for special values of l. Specifically, since the polynomial
Φ(X) = X l +X l−1 + ...+X + 1
is irreducible in GF (2)[X] if and only if
1) l + 1 is prime, and
2) 2 is a primitive root modulo l + 1, i.e., the powers 1, 2, 22, ..., 2l are distinct modulo l + 1,
for the values of l satisfying the two conditions above, GF (2l) can be embedded as a subring of
polynomials modulo X l+1−1. In this case, the multiplication of two elements in GF (2l) is tantamount to
multiplying the corresponding polynomials modulo X l+1−1, which in turn corresponds to the convolution
of the two binary vectors of length l. As is well-known, this convolution can be realized using O(l log l)
computations using FFT, and also on hardware using a linear finite shift register (LFSR) of length l. Also,
the inverse of elements of GF (2l), too, can be computed efficiently following the algorithm outlined in
[89, Section 2.5].
The main limitation of the construction above is that it is feasible only for selected values of l satisfying
the two conditions above. However, this is perhaps not a severe limitation since, if Artin’s conjecture
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holds, the number of such ls is infinite and one can identify such an l of a practically relevant order by
running a simple computer code 9.
An alternative construction, which circumvents the aforementioned limitation on the input length l,
entails using a randomly chosen Toeplitz matrix. Specifically, for a random seed S consisting of (l+k−1)
bits, the hash function fS : {0, 1}l → {0, 1}k is given by a k × l matrix A with the first row and the
first column consisting of elements of S and Ai,j = Ai−1,j−1 for 1 < i ≤ k and 1 < j ≤ l. It was
shown in [68] that the family of mappings fs(x) = Ax, s ∈ {0, 1}l+k−1, constitutes a k-bit UHF for
inputs of length l. Note that we can view the multiplication of an l-length vector x with a Toeplitz matrix
A as multiplying the extended (l + k − 1)-length vector x = (x1, ..., xl, 0, 0, 0..., 0) with the circulant
extension of A and taking the first k entries [61], [50]. Thus, we can efficiently implement this UHF
since multiplication with a circulant matrix is the same as convolution, which in turn can be computed
efficiently using FFT.
A simple modification of the Toeplitz matrix based UHF above was given in [41] for which the inverse-
image set can be efficiently computed as well. In this modified version, the random seed S consisting of
(l− 1) bits is used first to form a k× (l− k) Toeplitz matrix A as before, but fS(x) is given by [A, I]x,
where I is the k-dimensional identity matrix. Clearly, the corresponding family of mappings constitutes a
k-bit UHF with input length l. Furthermore, for m ∈ {0, 1}l, a uniform distribution on the inverse-image
set f−1S (m) can be computed efficiently, too, using the mapping φ(S,m,R) = (R,m − AR) where R
denotes (l − k) uniform random bits. Note that φ is indeed the inverse of f since
fS(φ(S,m, r)) = [A, I](r,m−Ar) = Ar +m−Ar = m,
for every s,m, r. However, this Toeplitz matrix based construction does not satisfy the conditions for a
balanced UHF and, therefore, cannot be used in Lemma 4. To wit, for a nonzero vector x ∈ {0, 1}l with
the first l − k entries 0, fs(x) = m holds for every s if m = −(xl−k+1, ..., xl) and for no s otherwise,
thereby violating condition (b) in the definition of a balanced UHF. Nevertheless, it satisfies condition
(a) and, by [43, Section V], will satisfy Lemma 4 when we restrict to a uniform random variable M .
It is also of interest to implement a UHF with as little shared randomness S as possible. See [50] for
constructions based on finite field arithmetic requiring the best known lengths of the shared seed S. In
particular, see [50, Table I] for a comparison of seed length required by various implementations available
in the literature. Another concern in hardware implementation of UHF is the power consumption. To this
end, a variant of the finite field arithmetic UHF proposed in [14] has been implemented as a low power
9A list of first 110 such l’s is available on http://oeis.org/A001122.
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CMOS circuit in [108].
For the remainder of this article, we shall assume that the required UHF or balanced UHF is imple-
mented using the finite field arithmetic based construction described above and depicted in Figure 4.
Multiplication in
GF (2l)
binary 
representation
    most 
significant bits
kX
S
f(S,X)
  bit input
  bit seed
l
l
Fig. 4: An efficiently implementable UHF based on finite field arithmetic
IV. PRACTICAL SECRET KEY AGREEMENT SCHEMES USING UHF
Extracting secret keys from correlated observations X and Y has two obstacles. First, although X and
Y are correlated they may not give rise to any shared randomness for the two parties. In fact, a seminal
result of Ga´cs and Ko¨rner [30] says that, in general, correlation cannot be converted into shared bits
without communication. Second, the shared bits that the parties can generate by communicating may not
be uniform or may not be concealed from the eavesdropper with access to the communication. All known
secret key agreement schemes circumvent these obstacles separately by first communicating to agree on a
shared randomness, a step referred to as information reconciliation, and then, extracting secret keys from
the generated shared randomness in the privacy amplification step. The choice of shared randomness to
generate and the tools for privacy amplification vary across the literature. For instance, the schemes in
[71], [2], [23], [72], [85], [29], [46] recover X as shared randomness at both parties while that in [26],
[27] recovers both X and Y . Also, [94] explores the role of the choice of shared randomness established
in the information reconciliation step in reducing the amount of communication for secret key agreement.
For privacy amplification, [23], [3], [26], [27] rely on the balanced coloring lemma which was introduced
in [3]. On the other hand, [11], [72], [85], [83], [44], [46] among several other works rely on the leftover
hash lemma.
A general construction in the context of biometric security is given in [29]. This construction is an
efficient implementation of the secret key agreement scheme suggested in [11] and [85], and many special
cases have appeared in implementation of PUFs; see, for instance, [31]. Also, constructions based on low
density parity check (LDPC) codes are given in [15] for a weaker notion of security, and the ones on
polar codes are given in [82], [20]; extensions to specific multiterminal models is considered in [106].
We now describe a generic secret key agreement scheme that can be implemented efficiently. For
simplicity, assume that X = (X1, ..., Xn) consists of n independent, unbiased, random bits and Y =
(Y1, ..., Yn) is such that (Xi, Yi) are mutually independent and each Yi is a possibly flipped version of
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Xi, where flip occurs with probability . Therefore, for large n, the Hamming distance between Xn and
Y n will be roughly τ = n. In fact, this scenario is typical, and it is common to process and quantize the
raw physical observations to extract independent bits (cf. [107], [67]). The extracted independent bits
can be tested for independence using standardized tests such as NIST SP-800-22-rev1a. For the purpose
of this article, we shall assume that n independent correlated bits (Xi, Yi)ni=1 have been extracted and
have been distributed between the two parties.
The first component of our secret key agreement scheme is an error-correcting code (ECC) that will
facilitate a compressed transmission of Xn to Y n. This classical problem in distributed data compression
was introduced by Slepian and Wolf in [90], and several efficient coding schemes accomplishing this are
known. For instance, [65] gives an implementation based on LDPC codes and [60] gives an implementa-
tion based on polar codes. In fact, a simple implementation based on linear ECC was suggested in [103]
and was used for secret key agreement in [106]; we review this scheme here. Let C be a linear ECC of
length n that can be efficiently decoded and can correct up to τ errors. On observing x, the first party
finds the coset leader for x in the standard array for the code C. This can be implemented efficiently
by using x as the input to an efficient decoder for C, noting the decoded codeword cx and evaluating
ex = x ⊕ cx. This coset leader ex is communicated to the second party over the public channel. The
second party knows y and computes y ⊕ ex = x⊕ e⊕ ex = cx ⊕ e. Recall that e has weight less than
τ with large probability, and therefore, cx can be recovered using the decoding algorithm for C. The
second party can recover x as cx ⊕ ex, completing the information reconciliation step.
At this point, both parties agree on an n-bit vector Xn, with a small probability of disagreement,
i.e., the second party has an estimate X̂n of Xn which differs from Xn with small probability of error.
Furthermore, a communication of, say, r bits has been revealed to the eavesdropper via the public channel.
In the privacy amplification step, the parties will use a UHF to extract a secret key from shared bits Xn.
In particular, to use the UHF of Figure 4, which can be implemented efficiently for input lengths l such
that l+1 is an odd prime and 2 is a primitive root modulo l+1, we find the largest such l ≤ n and use just
the first l bits (X1, ..., Xl). In order to select the range-size k, we first need to select a security criterion
and fix the desired security level under that criteria. For instance, to attain a security of δ under the total
variation distance, it follows from10 Lemma 2 that k = bHδ/2min(PXlZl |Z l)−r−2 log(2/δ)c suffices, where
Z denotes the side-information of the eavesdropper. Note that the security parameter δ is predecided and
r corresponds to maximum number of bits that may be communicated in the information reconciliation
step. Thus, to determine k, we only need to form an estimate of the quantity Hδ/2min(PXlZl |Z l). For the case
10We apply Lemma 2 with eavesdropper’s side-information in the role of Z1 and public communication in the role of Z2.
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of IID random variables (X l, Z l) considered here, the smooth conditional min-entropy Hδ/2min(PXlZl |Z l)
can be approximated by lH(X|Z) (see [52, Theorem 1] for bounds on approximation error at a fixed l).
The Shannon entropy H(X|Z) itself can be estimated by using N = Θ(|X ||Z|/ log |X ||Z|) independent
samples from (X,Z) [98]. If getting samples is expensive, we can take recourse to an alternative form of
the leftover hash lemma where the threshold is determined by Re´nyi entropy of order 2 (cf. [55], [11],
[83]). Specifically, using this form for the special case of constant Z, we can find an appropriate value
of k by estimating the Re´nyi entropy of order 2 of X , which requires only Θ(
√|X |) samples [1].
Once the value k is determined, a secret key is extracted by applying a k-bit UHF to X l and X̂ l at the
first and the second party, respectively. The overall scheme discussed here is illustrated in Figure 5. The
resulting secret key agreement is capacity achieving if we use an optimal rate Slepian-Wolf code in the
information reconciliation step. Note that the proposed scheme uses one-side communication between
the two parties, which can be strictly suboptimal at finite blocklengths if interactive communication is
allowed [46].
X Y
Xˆ
Slepian-Wolf code
(a) Information reconciliation using a Slepian-Wolf code
Xn Y n
dXn
Decoder
of ECC
Decoder
of ECC
(b) Linear Slepian-Wolf code
Xn dXn
UHF
of Fig. 3
UHF
of Fig. 3
Seed
S
Kx Ky
(c) Privacy amplification
Fig. 5: An efficient scheme for secret key agreement
V. PRACTICAL (AND MODULAR) WIRETAP CODES USING UHF
In order to present the main ideas underlying the constructive wiretap coding schemes, we review
briefly the classical capacity-achieving, information-theoretic coding schemes.
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To construct an (n, k) code for a wiretap channel (of rate k/n), Wyner [104] suggested to start with
a code C of length n and consider its partition C = unionsq2ki=1Ci such that
1) Each element of C lies in the typical set T n[P] (for a definition of typical set, see [25]);
2) C is a “good channel code” for T with small average probability of error;
3) each Ci is a channel code for T with average probability of error i, and the average of i with
respect to i is small.
To encode a uniformly distributed message M , the channel input Xn is chosen uniformly over CM . It
was shown in [104] that this scheme constitutes a valid wiretap code. In fact, by selecting C and its
partition randomly, we can attain the capacity of a degraded wiretap channel.
Interestingly, while [104] identified the general properties that an “ad-hoc” channel code C and the
corresponding partition unionsqiCi must satisfy to yield a good wiretap code, the actual code construction in
[104] entailed a joint selection of the code C as well as the corresponding partition. The construction in
[24] is of similar form and here, too, the wiretap code is obtained by a joint selection of the random
channel code and its partition. The construction in [23] (see, also, [25]), which attains the wiretap capacity
for a discrete, memoryless channel under strong security, also starts with a random code C and partitions
it using random binning11. The same holds for the scheme in [38] which relates a randomly generated
wiretap code to a channel resolvability code [35].
The information theoretic schemes above raise the following question: Is it possible to obtain good
wiretap codes by starting with any good channel code for T and partitioning it appropriately? Or is the
combined design suggested in the schemes above necessary? In fact, most of the constructive coding
schemes proposed for a wiretap channel follow the general template outlined above and design wiretap
codes by jointly selecting C and its partition, i.e., the partition is selected, intrinsically, based on the
underlying code itself. For instance, the LDPC codes based schemes in [93] extend the coset coding
scheme of [75] and select both the partition and the overall code C based on a specifically designed parity
check matrix (see [93, eqn. (21)]); the polar codes based scheme in [66] obtains the aforementioned
partitioning, in effect, by partitioning the polarized bits – the polarized bits that are “good” for the
legitimate receiver yield the overall code C and the partition is obtained by fixing the bits that are good
only for the legitimate receiver, one part for each fixed value of these bits (see, for instance, [66, eqn.
(25)]); other polar coding schemes in [87], [82], [33] have a similar form except that the partitioning of
polarized bits is more involved – a clear depiction of the partitioning of polarized bits in these schemes is
given in [33, Figures 1-4]; the same is true for the lattice codes based scheme suggested for the Gausssian
11Strong security is shown by taking recourse to the balanced coloring lemma; see [25] for a detailed account.
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wiretap channel in [7], [64], [63] where the partition corresponds to appropriately selected cosets in the
transmission lattice. These schemes, while quite important, will not be covered here in futher detail. An
interested reader can see [36] for a review.
Thus, deployment of any of these schemes in place of existing insecure channel codes will require a
complete redesign of the encoder and the decoder, which may not be feasible. Recently, [43], [8] proposed
a modular scheme that starts with a good channel code for T and converts it into a good wiretap code
by adding a pre-processing layer based on UHFs12. In fact, this modular scheme appeared first in [41]
for the special case when the underlying channel code for T is linear, and was shown to achieve the
capacity of a wiretap channel when both T and W are additive, with strong security (based on the mutual
information criterion13). The pre-processing layer of the proposed modular scheme is based on UHFs
and is shown to achieve the capacity of any symmetric, degraded, discrete wiretap channel in [43], [8],
[92] as well as that of a Gaussian wiretap channel in [96] (see, also, [48, Appendix D]), both under
strong security. In fact, when the underlying channel code for T has a certain linear structure, [8] showed
that this scheme achieves the capacity of a symmetric, degraded, discrete wiretap channel even under
semantic security (see, also, [48] for capacity results for the modular scheme under different restrictions
on the wiretap channel and the underlying channel code for T ). It remains unclear if such schemes can
attain the capacities of more general (including nondegraded) wiretap channels, as do the schemes of
[82], [33], or how does their overall performance compare with that of the schemes mentioned above.
Nevertheless, their ease of implementation makes them a leading contender for deployment in practical
applications such as protection against side-channel attack [17].
In the remainder of this section, we review this modular scheme. In the first subsection below, we
begin by presenting a seeded wiretap coding scheme where the encoder and the decoder, additionally,
have access to a uniformly distributed random seed S. In the subsequent subsection, this assumption of
shared random seed will be relaxed using the seed recycling scheme of [9], [10]. Specifically, a seed S
is transmitted to the legitimate receiver over the first few channel uses, and the same seed is re-used for
multiple instances of the seeded wiretap code. The security of this combined scheme relying on seed
recycling was established in [9], [10] using a hybrid argument.
12For a different, model of a wiretap channel, a coding scheme based on invertible extractors was given in [19].
13It was extended to the total variation distance based security in [42].
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A. Seeded wiretap codes
To motivate the scheme, suppose that we transmit a message U by first encoding it using an ECC for T
and then the legitimate receiver decodes U as Uˆ . Then, we are in a similar situation as that in the secret
key agreement of Figure 5 with U and Uˆ corresponding to the estimates of the reconciled information
after the first part of the scheme. We can extract a secret key M from U that remains concealed from the
eavesdropper’s observations using a UHF, as in the privacy amplification step of the scheme in Figure 5.
However, in the wiretap coding problem we are given a message M , and we must generate U from M
rather than the other way around. The main observation that leads to a wiretap coding scheme is that
if the extractor F obtained by uniformly choosing a mapping from a UHF is invertible, then we can
apply its inverse to the message M to obtain U and apply the extractor itself to the decoded message Uˆ ,
thereby simulating the privacy amplification step in Figure 5 and ensuring security.
The key technical component required for formalizing this idea is Lemma 4, the channel version of
the leftover hash lemma. Specifically, Lemma 4 shows that a balanced UHF constitutes a stochastic
transformation Γ which converts a given channel V into a channel V ′ = V ◦ Γ with a different input
alphabet M but the same output alphabet such that the input m of V ′ remains secure from an observer
of the output of V ′ and an observer of the random input of V (output of Γ) can determine m.
Suppose that we are given an ECC C for the transmission channel T with encoder e0 : {0, 1}l →
X n, where X denotes the input of the wiretap channel. The code C is assumed to facilitate a reliable
transmission of l-bit messages over Tn with the maximum probability of error less than pe. To convert
this code into an (n, k) wiretap code, we add a pre-processing layer to it consisting of a b-balanced
k-bit UHF {fs, s ∈ S} with input length l. In order to send a message m ∈ M, the pre-processing
layer generates a seed S uniformly over S and outputs a random binary vector U of length l distributed
uniformly over f−1S (m). This vector U is then encoded using e0 and transmitted over W . In particular,
we use the efficiently invertible (l−k)-balanced UHF of Figure 4 forM = {0, 1}k. By our assumptions
for the code C, the random vector U can be decoded at the output of the transmission channel T with
probability of error less than pe. Thus, if the random seed S is available to the legitimate receiver, the
transmitted message m ∈ M, too, can be recovered with probability of error less than pe by applying
fS to the decoded vector Uˆ . For the security of this scheme, it follows from Lemma 4, applied with the
augmented channel Wn,C = Wn ◦ eo in the role of V , that for a uniformly distributed message M
I (M ∧ Z, S) ≤ 1
ln 2
· 2−(l−k−Imax(Wn,C)) + k.
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Fig. 6: A seeded coding scheme for the wiretap channel
Therefore, the overall modular scheme, depicted in Figure 6, constitutes a good (n, k) wiretap code14
provided that k is selected appropriately to ensure small leakage I (M ∧ Z, S). Specifically, suppose that
the code C is of rate R, i.e., l = nR. We show in the Appendix that there exists a c > 0 such that, for
 = 2−nc, Imax (Wn,C) is asymptotically less than nCW , where CW denotes the capacity of the channel
W , both in the case of a discrete memoryless channel (DMC) W and in the case of an additive white
Gaussian noise (AWGN) channel W with average input power constraints. Thus, upon choosing
k
n
= R′ < R− CW ,
for a uniformly distributed M , I (M ∧ Zn, S) vanishes to zero exponentially rapidly in n.
In fact, for a symmetric, discrete channel W , if the underlying ECC is linear and the balanced (l−k)-
balanced UHF of Figure 4 is used, it was shown in [9], [10] that strong security shown above implies
semantic security as well.
B. Modular wiretap coding scheme based on seed recycling
In the previous section, we established the security of our scheme assuming that a random seed S was
shared publically. We now show that this assumption is not required, even for semantic security, using a
14To be precise, the proposed code with the choice of UHF in Figure 4 can send 2k − 1 messages because the all 0 message
is excluded from the message set M.
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seed recycling trick from [9], [10]. We first use the legitimate channel T to transmit the seed S reliably to
the receiver in nc channel uses, where the constant c is chosen to ensure the recovery of S at the receiver
with probability of error less than pe. Next, to compensate for the rate loss due to the transmission of S,
we use the same shared seed S to send tn messages M1, ...,Mtn using tn independent implementations
of the seeded wiretap coding scheme of the previous subsection. The resulting probability of error in
transmitting the concatenated message M tn = (M1, ...,Mtn) in overall N channel uses is bounded above
by (tn+1)pe. Also, by combining15 [9, Theorem 4.5, 4.9], [8, Lemma 4.2], and the fact that I (M ∧ Zn, S)
vanishes to 0 exponentially rapidly in n, it follows that maxPMtn I
(
M tn ∧ ZN) ≤ tn2−nc′ for some
constant c′ > 0. The rate of the overall scheme is given by
lim
n→∞
tnk
(tn + c)n
,
which equals R′ as long as tn → ∞ as n → ∞. Therefore, if we choose tn such that this condition
is satisfied and both16 (tn + 1)pe,n and tn2−nc
′
vanish to 0, we get a wiretap coding scheme satisfying
semantic security of any rate R′ < R−CW . Furthermore, if the underlying ECC C can be implemented
efficiently, so can the combined scheme above. Note that the argument above is required to reduce the
semantic security of an unseeded scheme to that of a seeded scheme. For the strong security criterion,
a much simpler argument based on chain rule for mutual information suffices. Specifically, consider a
uniformly distributed message (M1, ...,Mtn). Note that Mi, 1 ≤ i ≤ tn are IID uniform, which further
implies that for each i the random variables (Mi, Zn(i)) are conditionally independent of (Mj , Zn(j))j 6=i
given S. Therefore,
I(M1, ...,Mtn ∧ ZN ) ≤ I(M1, ...,Mtn ∧ ZN , S)
= I(M1, ...,Mtn ∧ Zn(1), ..., Zn(tn)|S)
≤
tn∑
i=1
I(Mi ∧ Zn(1), ..., Zn(tn)|S)
=
tn∑
i=1
I(Mi ∧ Zn(i)|S)
= tnI(M1 ∧ Zn(1), S). (11)
15As mentioned before, our security requirement is even stronger than the original semantic security requirement of [8], which
can be shown for the combined scheme simply by using [8, Lemma 4.2]; [9, Theorem 4.5, 4.9] are required to move between
the two notions of security.
16The probability of error pe = pe,n for the transmission code C depends on n and, in principle, can vanish to 0 exponentially
rapidly in n.
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The security proof is completed by appropriately choosing tn →∞ as above.
To summarize, the argument above allows us to convert any efficiently implementable transmission
code for T of rate R into a code of rate R−CW for the wiretap channel, with a vanishing probability of
error and under strong security. Furthermore, the conversion is done simply by including an efficiently
implementable pre-processing layer based on a balanced UHF. Note that for the special case of a Gaussian
wiretap channel or a symmetric, degraded, discrete wiretap channel, the modular scheme described above
attains the wiretap capacity if the underlying ECC C achieves the capacity CT of the transmission channel
T since, for these cases, the wiretap capacity is given by CT −CW [62]. In fact, for a discrete symmetric
wiretap channel, if the underlying capacity achieving ECCC is linear and capacity achieving for T , the
modular scheme achieves the wiretap capacity even under semantic security.
Recall that the balanced UHF of Figure 6 can be implemented efficiently only for selected values of
input length l. Thus, given an ECC C for T , we simply use the largest l less than the input length of
C (in bits). Also, the analysis above was asymptotic and cannot be applied for a fixed n. For a fixed
n, the output length k of the balanced UHF, and consequently the message length, must be chosen to
be appropriately smaller than l − Imax (Wn,C) to get the desired security level. For this purpose, it is
required to estimate the quantity Imax (Wn,C) for a given ECC C and for a sufficiently small ; however,
there are no results to report in this context yet. Furthermore, one might also wish to compare the finite
blocklength performance of this scheme, for different choices of ECC C, with the fundamental lower
bounds similar to those derived for the channel coding problem in [40], [77]. However, no such bounds
are available. In fact, even the strong converse for a degraded wiretap channel was proved only recently
in [45].
The coding scheme for the basic wiretap model above is a stepping-stone for deriving schemes for
more complicated wiretap channel models such as the MIMO wiretap channel considered in [59]. It can
be expected that, based on the simple scheme above, schemes for other more complicated physical-layer
channel models will emerge. One such extension, with a rather wide scope, appears in [48].
APPENDIX
Consider a channel W : X → Z and an encoder (for ECCs) e0 : {0, 1}l → {0, 1}n. Denote by
We0 : {0, 1}l → Zn the augmented channel Wn ◦ e0 where given an input v ∈ {0, 1}n, with xi denoting
the ith coordinate of e0(v), the outputs Zi are independent and distributed as W (·|xi), 1 ≤ i ≤ n. In
this section, we shall derive an asymptotic bound for Inmax(We0) for an exponentially small n and for
a DMC W with any encoder e0 as well as for an AWGN channel W with an encoder e0 satisfying the
average power constraint P with probability 1.
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First, consider a DMC W : X → Z .
Lemma 5. For any encoder e0 and a DMC W : X → Z with finite input and output alphabets X and
Y , respectively, there exists a constant c > 0 such that for n = e−nc
Inmax(We0) ≤ nmax
PX
I (X ∧ Z) + o(n).
Proof: We first prove the result for a constant composition code where each codeword e0(v) is
of a fixed type P , i.e., for e0 such that each element x ∈ X appears nP (x) times in every codeword
xn = e0(v).
Denote by T[W ] the set of sequences (xn, zn) such that zn is W -conditionally typical given xn, by
T[P,W ] the set of sequences (xn, zn) ∈ T[W ] such that xn has type P , and by T[PW ] the projection of
T[P,W ] on Zn (these notations are a slight deviation from those used in [25]). Then, using basic results
from the method of types (see [25, Chapter 2]) for each (xn, zn) ∈ T[P,W ], it holds that
logWn(zn | xn) ≤ −nH(W | P ) + o(n).
Furthermore,
log |T[PW ]| ≤ nH(PW ) + o(n),
where PW denotes the output distribution for channel W when the input distribution is P . Since there
exists a c > 0 such that for all v
∑
zn:(e0(v),zn)/∈T[W ]
Wn(zn | e0(v)) ≤ 2−nc,
for the subnormalized channel We0,T[W ] defined by (2), we have
Imax (We0) ≤ Imax
(
We0,T[W ]
)
= log
∑
z
max
v
Wn(zn | e0(v))1
(
(e0(v), z
n) ∈ T[W ]
)
≤ −nH(W | P ) + log
∑
z
max
v
1
(
(e0(v), z
n) ∈ T[W ]
)
+ o(n)
≤ −nH(W | P ) + log |T[PW ]|+ o(n)
≤ nI(P ;W ) + o(n), (12)
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where the last-but-one inequality uses the fact that (e0(v), zn) ∈ T[W ] implies zn ∈ T[PW ] and so
max
v
1
(
(e0(v), z
n) ∈ T[W ]
) ≤ 1 (zn ∈ T[PW ]) = |T[PW ]|.
This completes the proof for a constant composition code.
Proceeding to the case of a general code, denote by CP the set of codewords e0(v) of type P . As
before, we have
Imax (We0) ≤ Imax
(
We0,T[W ]
)
= log
∑
z
max
v
Wn(zn | e0(v))1
(
(e0(v), z
n) ∈ T[W ]
)
≤ log
∑
P
∑
z
max
xn∈CP
Wn(zn | xn)1 ((xn, zn) ∈ T[W ])
≤ nmax
PX
I(PX ;W ) + o(n),
where the final inequality is obtained in the manner of (12) upon using the fact that the number of types
is polynomial in n (cf. [25, Lemma 2.1]).
Next, consider an AWGN channel W : R→ R, i.e., a channel such that for an input x ∈ R the output
Z is distributed as W (·|x) = N (0, σ2W ). Let e0 : {0, 1}l → {0, 1}n be an encoder satisfying the average
power constraint
1
n
‖e0(v)‖22 ≤ P, ∀ v ∈ {0, 1}l. (13)
The next result shows that the n-smooth max-information for We0 is bounded above by, roughly, n times
the capacity of the AWGN W with average input power constraint P , for an exponentially small n.
Lemma 6. Let W : R→ R be an AWGN channel with noise variance σ2W , and let e0 : {0, 1}l → Rn
be an encoder satisfying (13). Then, denoting n = e−nδ
2/8, for the combined channel We0 it holds that
Inmax(We0) ≤
n
2
log
(
1 +
P
σ2W
)
+ nδ log e+ o(n),
for every 0 < δ sufficiently small.
Proof: Denote by g(z) the standard normal density on Rn, by Z0 the set {zn : ‖zn‖22 ≤ n(σ2W +
P )(1 + δ)}, and by Zxn the set {zn : ‖zn − xn‖22 ≥ nσ2W (1− δ)}. Further, denote
T = {(xn, zn) : ‖xn‖22 > nP, zn ∈ Rn}
⋃
{(xn, zn) : ‖xn‖22 ≤ nP, zn ∈ Zxn ∩ Z0}.
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Then, by the tail bounds for non-central χ2 RVs in [13, Lemma 8.1] and for χ2 RVs (cf. [5, Exercise
2.1.30]), we have
Wn({zn : (xn, zn) ∈ T }|xn) ≥ 1− n,
when δ is sufficiently small. The following inequalities ensue:
Inmax(We0) ≤ Imax (We0,T )
= log
∫
Rn
max
v
g
(
z − e0(v)
σW
)
1 ((e0(v), z
n) ∈ T )dz
≤ log e
−n(1−δ)
2
(2piσ2W )
n
2
∫
Rn
max
v
1 ((e0(v), z
n) ∈ T )dz
≤ log e
−n(1−δ)
2
(2piσ2W )
n
2
vol (Z0) ,
where the previous two inequalities hold by the definition of T since e0(v) satisfies (13) for all v. Denote
by Bn(ρ) the sphere of radius ρ in Rn and by νn(ρ) its volume, which can be approximated as (cf. [100])
νn(ρ) =
1√
npi
(
2pie
n
)n
2
ρn
(
1 +O(n−1)
)
.
Therefore, applying the volume formula above to ρn =
√
n(σ2W + P )(1 + δ) and continuing with the
foregoing bounds for Inmax(We0), we get
Inmax(We0) ≤ log
e−
n(1−δ)
2
(2piσ2W )
n
2
νn(ρn)
= log
[
e
nδ
2√
npi
(
ρ2n
nσ2W
)n
2 (
1 +O(n−1)
)]
= log
[
e
nδ
2√
npi
[(
1 +
P
σ2W
)
(1 + δ)
]n
2 (
1 +O(n−1)
)]
≤ n
2
log
(
1 +
P
σ2W
)
+ nδ log e+ o(n),
where we have used log(1 + x) ≤ x log e in the last inequality.
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